The Turks and Russians’ preoccupation with facing the Coronavirus did not forget them to implement the pledges of understanding of Moscow announced on the fifth of this March, which started with the decision to cease fire on the Idlib fronts and its vicinity, in preparation for a wider field, military and political movement.
The conduct of unilateral patrols on both sides of the M-4 road is not among the main objectives of the agreement of the two presidents, Turkish Erdogan and Russian Putin, but the agreed priorities are to accelerate the process of activating the movement of joint military patrols, in preparation for the opening of the road between Aleppo and Latakia.
The most important goal, of course, is to remove the obstacles in the face of this decision, which are delaying its implementation, which are “radical groups” that tried to respond in two directions: obstructing the progress of joint patrols by inciting the civilian population there, to reject the Russian presence that does not guarantee the withdrawal of the regime forces from the areas to which they come at the expense of The Sochi Agreement, facilitating the return of tens of thousands of displaced people to their villages and homes, and targeting Turkish soldiers directly, as happened several days ago in its missile attack, which resulted in two deaths and a third wounded.
President Erdogan has said that retreating from Turkish positions and policies in Syria anymore would be more costly to Turkey and its interests there.
After the Moscow summit, there was not much talk about Sochi and its decisions.
Rather, the question became whether Ankara accepted to replace the Safe Zone plan with the safe passage that is being prepared north of the international road M4 and its south.
The number of Turkish military observation and deployment points in the countryside of Idlib, Hama and Aleppo has recently increased to about 45 points. A peek at the quality of the Turkish logistical and engineering machinery and equipment that entered the region reflects the fact that the first Turkish goal is not to enhance the presence north of the M-4 international road, as much as it is a message to these groups that the battle of decisiveness with them is approaching after Ankara hesitated to take this step months, Which was at the forefront of the reasons for the military and field scene to reach what it is today.
The Kremlin spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, has repeatedly called for avoiding building negative scenarios regarding Russian-Turkish relations in Idlib and Syria. Turkish Foreign Minister Shaoyeshoglu has stated from the start that we should not allow the Syrian crisis to affect the relations of cooperation and coordination between Ankara and Moscow.
The Turkish and Russian leaders succeeded in blocking the road that was not calculated in their confrontation with Syria.
And there is little talk in Ankara about the expiry date of the warning that Erdogan sent to the Syrian army, who has not withdrawn his forces to the lines beyond the Sochi understandings, nor about these same understandings.
Operation Turkish Spring Shield fell in favor of the Moscow summit.
And the war declared by the head of the National Movement Party, Dolh Bahceli, against Damascus, hours after targeting the Turkish watchtowers in Idlib, ended it himself, after he returned to support the Turkish-Russian understandings that made an important leap towards settlements in the city where Pskov says that the situation settled after the signing of the two presidents Putin and Erdogan signed a memorandum of understanding on the region in early March, and that the Turkish side pledged to take close measures to liquidate the extremist groups that hinder the movement of joint patrols.
Al Sham Liberation Headquarter (Al Nusra Front) and its counterparts know that the zero hour against them has started.
Ankara and Moscow know that these groups that have lost dominance on the ground will try to take cover in the human shields in Idlib.
What is not known yet is whether or not this operation against these groups will be a joint Turkish-Russian one.
It will soon be clear why the Russian Minister of Defense, Sergey Shoigu, kidnapped in Damascus, and whether it is to prepare for the southwestern Idlib operation, or is it a preliminary move to launch to continue military operations on the Saraqib, Kafr Nebel and Jabal Zawiyah fronts, or if Moscow moves, as the Ministry of Defense says The Russian Federation, directed by President Putin, aims to “discuss ways to ensure a sustainable cessation of hostilities in the Idlib area, and to establish stability in the rest of Syria”, and it is not excluded that Shoygu briefed Damascus on the scenario of Turkish-Russian understandings to end the radical groups in Idlib, stumbling block in front of all field and political coordination in the region.
Damascus has been talking for some time about the anticipated Turkish-Russian military action in Idlib against these groups, and it is also talking about the “American robbery of Syrian oil and wealth”.
Is it a greeting message to Ankara regarding its new old proposal to allocate a share of oil revenues in the east of the country to finance the needs and projects of displacement and asylum, and be a link in the comprehensive Turkish-Russian understandings plan in Syria?
Is the Turkish-Russian plan a trade-off for what will happen in Idlib with what will happen in Ain Al-Arab, Tel Rifaat and Manbij, for example?
Is the goal a Russian guarantee to Ankara that ending the Al Nusra front existence in Idlib is more important than the issue of the advancement of the regime forces in these areas, and that the understandings mean northern Syria and removing the remaining pockets in front of Ankara to link the areas of its military operations with each other?
Ankara wants to return to the Sochi understandings, and Damascus wants to advance to the border areas in northwestern Syria, what Moscow wants here, and what it has agreed with Ankara is among the priorities for everyone as well.
Does the new Turkish-Russian agreement include the issue of the Iranian military presence in the Idlib area?
And how will the Turkish demands and goals related to returning the Syrian army forces to the places from which they originated months ago, facilitating the return of tens of thousands of displaced people and refugees to their areas in northwestern Syria, and achieving the dream of the safe zone with regional and international understanding about financing its construction be achieved with part of the Syrian oil revenues in East Euphrates?